THE CHALLENGE OF SPACEPOWER

U. S. Senator Bob Smith (R-NH)

November 18, 1998

Speech before the Fletcher School/Institute for Foreign Policy

Analysis Annual Conference, Cambridge, Massachusetts

INTRODUCTION

In speaking to you this evening, I know that I am about to hold forth on aerospace matters to some of the most experienced thinkers and practitioners in aerospace today. I also know that it is now mid-November in an election year, and your patience for Washington wisdom has worn a little thin. Frankly, as I gathered my thoughts for this evening, and considered the enormous complexity addressed by this conference--from physics and astronomy, to politics and ideology, to programs and budgets--I was reminded of Mark Twain's admonition that "it is better to keep your mouth shut and appear stupid than to open it and remove all doubt."

But Mark Twain also warned us to never let our schooling get in the way of our education. My education in aerospace has been in Congress. I came to the House of Representatives in 1985, and served on the Space Subcommittee of the Science and Technology Committee until my election to the Senate in 1990. During that period, President Reagan reinvigorated America's awareness of the possibilities of space with his Strategic Defense Initiative. I participated in the twists and turns of some very difficult issues--

the Hubble telescope, expendable launch vehicles versus the space shuttle, the Challenger disaster, and the Space Station. I became a staunch supporter of space programs during those turbulent years, and my interest in space has deepened since then. As Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Armed Services, my focus is now more on the national security applications of space--but I have never lost my fascination with the sheer mystery of it all. And I hope my on-the-job education in Congress has taught me a few things.

As Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, it is a pleasure--and my duty

to share my thoughts on space with you. The scope of this conference is aerospace--but I am going to talk about spacepower.

My remarks tonight rest on three assertions: first, America's future security and prosperity depend on our constant supremacy in space; second, while we are ahead of any potential rival in exploiting space, we are not unchallenged, and our future dominance is by no means assured; and third, to achieve true dominance we must combine expansive thinking with a sustained and substantial commitment of resources, and vest them in a dedicated, politically powerful, independent advocate for spacepower.

Thanks to Star Trek, space is often called the "Final Frontier." I call it the "Permanent Frontier." It is without end, forever, limitless. It is truly a realm where--the more you learn--the more you realize just how much more is yet to learn. I am very excited about our future in space, but there is much more we have to do. All of us--military leaders like Generals Ryan and Myers, strategic thinkers like Professors Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, politicians like me, and the broad range of experts represented in this room tonight--must work together as partners if we are to ensure America's preeminence in space.

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

With our hardware and our brainpower, the United States has unchallenged mastery of air, sea, and land. Except for our government's failure to defend us from ballistic missiles--a glaring, reprehensible exception--no one can seriously threaten us with conventional forces.

Experts on such things say that this is a period of "strategic pause"--a rare opportunity to catch our breath and rethink our strategy and force structure. I tend to agree. While the Cold War required us to follow a course of incremental advances in doctrine and procurement just to keep pace with the Kremlin, nothing of the scope and scale of that technological competition exists today--as they say at the War Colleges, we have no "peer competitors." We are very lucky that our overwhelming strength offers us such a crucial margin for error in an unpredictable world. Saddam Hussein's recent activities certainly speak to that unpredictability.

I vigorously oppose those who use this fortunate circumstance to justify reckless cuts in defense spending, or to rationalize their refusal to support an effective ballistic missile defense. But I do see an opportunity for us to exploit this period of unchallenged conventional superiority on Earth to shift substantial resources to space. I believe we can and must do this, and if we do, we will buy generations of security that all the ships, tanks, and airplanes in the world will not provide. This would be a real "peace dividend"--

it would actually help keep the peace.

None of us can truly imagine the opportunities that space may one day offer. But for now, I think we can agree that space offers us the prospect of inflicting violence; of defending ourselves, our deployed forces and our allies; and of seeing and communicating throughout the world--all with great precision and nearly instantaneously, and often more cheaply. With credible offensive and defensive space control, we will deter and dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies, and guard our nation's growing reliance on global commerce. Without it, we will become vulnerable beyond our worst fears.

SHORTCHANGING SPACE

In their rhetoric, both the Department of Defense and the Air Force have acknowledged the importance and promise of spacepower. In his 1998 report to Congress, Secretary Cohen stated that "spacepower has become as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power." In 1995, the Air Force made clear in "Global Engagement" that: "The medium of space is one which cannot be ceded to our nation's adversaries. The Air Force must plan to prevail in the use of space."

Expanding and refining our ability to gather and transmit information has been the Defense Department's principal focus in the space arena. The Air Force's space budget is dedicated almost entirely to the maintenance and improvement of information systems, as a means of increasing the effectiveness of existing forces here on Earth. But as important as early warning, intelligence, navigation, weather, and communications systems may be, today they are basically dedicated to supporting non-space forms of power projection. Even the Air Force's Space Warfare Center and Space Battlelab are focused primarily on figuring out how to use space systems to put information into the cockpit in order to more accurately drop bombs from aircraft.

This is not space warfare--it is using space to support air warfare. It is essentially the space component of "information superiority." Given the degree of importance that Joint Vision 2010 and other recent statements of policy and doctrine give to information superiority, it is understandable that the Air Force and the Department of Defense have tried so hard to fully exploit the information revolution. But if we limit our approach to space to just information superiority, we will not have fully utilized spacepower.

Four years ago, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff challenged the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board to "search the world for the most advanced aerospace ideas and project them into the future." Among the many valuable findings in the resulting New World Vistas report was the following conclusion: "For the U.S. to sustain its superpower status it will become necessary not only to show global awareness through space-based information, but also to be able to project power from space directly to the earth's surface or to airborne targets with kinetic or directed energy weapons." Imagine, for a moment, the utility of space-based directed energy weapons in dealing with Saddam Hussein.

But as I look at the way it is organized, trained and equipped, I do not see the Air Force building the material, cultural, and organizational foundations of a service dedicated to spacepower. Indeed, in some respects we are moving backward. Three years ago the Air Force published Global Engagement, which spoke of a transition "from an air force to an air and space force on an evolutionary path to a space and air force." This language, heavily influenced by the revolutionary vision in the New World Vistas report, was consistent with the kind of leap into spacepower that I am calling for tonight. But this year the Air Force uniformed leadership replaced the vision laid out in Global Engagement with the concept of an "aerospace force." Although this new approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the development of spacepower, it would appear to reflect the view that space is fundamentally an information medium to be integrated into existing air, land, and sea forces.

Once again, I believe that fully integrating space-based information capabilities into existing concepts and organizations is an important near-term goal. Both the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office have done a good job at advancing this cause. But if this is all there is to aerospace, then it is a woefully deficient concept. It is not spacepower.

Where are the science and technology investments and the technology demonstrations that the Air Force is currently pursuing in order to build for a future spacepower projection capability? Where is the Air Force's space-based missile defense development program? A space-based laser program that does not envision a technology demonstration for 15 years nor an operational capability for 35 years is not serious. Where is the Air Force's military spaceplane program? Does the Air Force really want to stand idle while NASA develops a follow-on to the Space Shuttle that may contribute only marginally to meeting the requirements of military spacepower? Compared to the magnitude of the technical challenges involved--and these programs’ potential military value--the investments being made by the Air Force in these areas are paltry. In some cases--

the spaceplane, kinetic energy ASAT, and Clementine II programs--I have had to personally earmark funds to get the Air Force to move forward at all.

Personnel investments are also inadequate. Many of the institutions of space power have been established within the Department of Defense, including joint and service space commands and the 14th Air Force, but I still do not see the emergence of a warfighting community within the Air Force that in any way rivals the air and missile organizations. Having one or two space generals rise to the senior levels of Air Force leadership is not enough. Similarly, a service that promotes only one space officer at a time to brigadier general is not showing much commitment to spacepower.

Right now there are 12 general officers in Air Force Space Command. None are career space officers--although three have had 3 space assignments and three have had 2 space assignments (including their current jobs). The other generals are serving for the first time in space jobs. A further breakout shows that five of the twelve are command pilots, six are command missiliers and one has a command and control background. How many general officers at Air Combat Command are not command pilots?

Nor has the Air Force taken the steps to build a dedicated space warfare cadre of younger officers. The attempt to combine space and missile personnel and the tendency to assign non-space officers to lead space organizations may ultimately undermine the development of a true spacepower culture. Although I strongly support flexibility in the career paths among different warfighting communities throughout our military services, it has gone too far when most of the Air Force's space institutions and commands are led by officers who are not space specialists.

EMBRACING SPACEPOWER

To ask if the Air Force is serious about space is to ask the wrong question. The Air Force has played the dominant role in military space matters for decades. A significant portion of its budget has gone toward developing and operating the nation's military space systems. So no one should question the Air Force's proud space legacy. But an honored past does not automatically mean that the Air Force is correctly poised for the future.

What do the Department of Defense and the Air Force need to do in order to create the conditions necessary for the emergence of spacepower? Let me offer the following recommendations, as intellectual fodder, if not an actual roadmap forward. Some of these suggestions are specifically directed toward the Air Force, while others are directed more generally toward the Department of Defense.

First, we must foster a space power culture. We must create an environment in which revolutionary thinking about spacepower is not only accepted, but rewarded. We should strive to recreate for spacepower the type of intellectual environment that was created for airpower in the wake of World War II by General Hap Arnold. We simply cannot allow a blanket of political correctness and bureaucratic inertia to smother those who would offer us the most innovative and revolutionary visions for exploiting space. The emergence of a real spacepower force will require the creation of a highly skilled, dedicated cadre of space warriors clearly focused on spacepower applications--not merely on helping air, sea, and ground units to do their job better.

Second, we should be more creative in maximizing the cooperation between military, civil, and commercial space practitioners. We need to aggressively work with the commercial sector to find a new equilibrium in which private profit and government cost reduction meet both commercial and military needs more cheaply. The Department of Defense must also cooperate more with other users of space--

NASA, the NRO, and the commercial sector. Partnering on a range of technology demonstrations is one way to leverage our investments. We must also carefully consider the potential for privatization and commercial partnering in certain elements of DoD’s space infrastructure--for example, the creation and maintenance of multipurpose spaceports. The Department's existing willingness to enter into public-private partnerships in the area of depot maintenance, for example, might also be applied to the space launch arena. In this regard, however, we must exercise great caution to ensure that government control of warfighting capabilities is not jeopardized.

Above all, we must give our space warriors the tools they need. Let me be clear--if the potential savings I've described here are not sufficient, the Department of Defense must simply begin to dedicate a larger portion of its budget to the development and fielding of spacepower systems. We cannot simply walk away from core missions or legacy systems. But we also cannot continue an investment strategy that continually consigns spacepower systems to the "out-" or even the "way-out" years--especially when spacepower may provide faster, better, and cheaper offense and defense.

TWO OPTIONS

We will need more than a better spacepower culture--and more than money--if we hope to dominate the Permanent Frontier. We must be willing to dramatically restructure our institutional approach to this ultimate strategic theater. As a baseball fan and coach, I am fond of Yogi Berra--many of you remember his advice: "when you get to a fork in the road, take it." Well, today the Air Force is at a fork in the road. The Air Force must truly step up to the spacepower mission, or give it to another organization. In plain English, the Air Force is going to have to change.

The National Command Authority has established the policy foundations for such a transition. According to the President's October 1998 National Security Strategy: "Our policy is to promote development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects our vital national security interests." With its Global Engagement strategy, the Air Force itself established the vision of a space and air force--in that order. Now the Air Force must decide whether it is willing to make the internal choice to fully embrace spacepower.

Changing the Air Force . . .

Let's not sugarcoat this--this will mean shedding big chunks of today's Air Force to pay for tomorrow’s, and it will be very painful. Congress could help by allowing the Air Force to keep any savings from this divestiture and allocate them directly to space programs. But if such a change proves impossible, then we in Congress will have no choice but to consider another alternative.

Many of you will not want to hear this--perhaps some of you will--but the notion that the Air Force should have primary responsibility for space is not sacred. For the most part, space is well outside the "Wild Blue Yonder." Just because space hardware and signals move about over our heads, must space be the exclusive domain of the Air Force?

This is not a new question--in 1995, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command found "no compelling arguments" to make the Air Force solely responsible for the design, launch and operation of space systems. In 1997, retired Air Force Gen Charles Horner told Space News: "If the Air Force clings to its ownership of space, then tradeoffs will be made between air and space, when in fact the tradeoff should be made elsewhere." And speaking before this very gathering last year, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak, stated that ". . . between 2015 and 2025, we have an opportunity to put a fleet on another sea. And that sea is space. Now the Air Force in the audience are saying, 'Hey that's mine!’ And I'm saying, 'You're not taking it.’ "

These officers express legitimate frustrations, but I see a risk that their concern could lead to a Balkanization of spacepower. This would be a setback. A better approach to explore might be to vest U.S. Space Command with authority similar to that held by U.S. Special Operations Command--the Major Force Program or MFP structure. MFP-11 gives CINCSOC substantial control over development, acquisition, promotions and assignments in this unique mission area.

U.S. Space Command is perhaps the only institution within the Department of Defense that is developing both the theory and practical plans for spacepower. But CINCSPACE needs the teeth and claws to compete for, and dispense, Department of Defense resources. As a conservative Republican, I am opposed to unnecessary bureaucracy. But spacepower is every bit as important as special operations--perhaps, like special ops, spacepower should have its own Major Force Program, and even its own Assistant Secretary of Defense.

...or Creating a New 'Space Force?’

Ultimately--if the Air Force cannot or will not embrace spacepower, and if the SOCOM model does not translate--we in Congress will have to establish an entirely new service. This may sound dramatic here tonight, but it is an increasingly real option. As I have tried to convey, I want us to dominate space--and frankly, I am less concerned with which service does it than I am committed to getting it done. This view is increasingly shared by my colleagues. Creating a new military service to exploit a new medium is not without precedent. Indeed, if any of our services should understand this point of transition, it should be the Army Air Corps . . . I mean the Air Force.

Let's look back for a moment. At the close of World War I, the Army General Staff viewed military aviation as a servant of ground forces, and opposed the development of a new service that would conduct a new set of roles and missions. Senior officers with little or no operational experience were chosen to guide the development of the new aviation technologies, roles, and missions. Ground officers controlled promotion of aviation officers. The General Staff refused to fund acquisition at levels needed by aviators. The vast majority of Army officers were ignorant of--and indifferent to--

disparities between U.S. and foreign development of air power. The Army exiled or forced into retirement its internal critics. By any measure aviation had an inferior status within the Army. And as a result, advocates of new roles and missions for aviation, like Billy Mitchell, sought organizational independence to implement their ideas. The result was the creation by Congress of the Army Air Corps in 1926--and ultimately, the United States Air Force in 1947.

A "space force" would put the same bureaucratic and political muscle behind space missions that the Army, Navy, and Air Force flex in theirs today. A separate service would allow spacepower to compete for funding within the entire defense budget, lessening the somewhat unfair pressure on the Air Force to make most of the tradeoffs, and protecting spacepower programs from being raided by more popular and well-established programs. A separate service would create an incentive for people to develop needed new skills to operate in space, and a promotion pathway to retain those people. And a separate service would rationalize the division of labor among the services--and consolidate those tasks that require specialized knowledge, such as missilery and space--so that this specialized knowledge could be applied more effectively.

When I began this evening, I acknowledged the limits of my technical and operational expertise in this subject. But I have been a member of Congress for nearly 14 years, and I do know this: very often an organized advocate equals political power, and political power gets the resources. We may not like this--and any handful of us might be able to sit down and divide things up better--but that is not how the American political system works. I'd bet that in a Department of Defense comprised of four service departments, a space force would get a fair share. This is a crude method, but it is one way to ensure that spacepower gets resources.

As with any other major change, there are risks. A separate service would not be immune to bureaucratic stagnation and the suppression of new ideas as leaders seek to achieve a single "vision" and unanimity behind it. It is an unfortunate reality that unity of bureaucratic effort often seeks to avoid competition of ideas, the very competition we need if we are to learn how to make new things and how to do new things. There is no guarantee that the initial vision--whichever one wins in bureaucratic competition--would be the most effective in real combat against a wide range of adversaries.

A separate service will face coordination problems with the existing services as it seeks to integrate space concerns into the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force operational concepts-

although Goldwater-Nichols should help reduce the magnitude of this problem. A separate service would surely add a level of bureaucracy and associated costs--although this would be offset somewhat by the consolidation of existing functions and commands within the new service. And of course, there would be decisions to make about which commands and functions to place under a new space service--I would personally struggle, for example, with the question of which ballistic missile defense programs to include.

This would be a dramatic step. Perhaps a "space corps"--like the Marine Corps, a separate service, but without a secretariat

would be a step toward a "space force." Maybe the Air Force preempts these dramatic changes by truly becoming the "Space and Air Force." But space dominance is simply too important to allow any bureaucracy, military department, service mafia, or parochial concern to stand in the way. And tonight I am recommitting myself to mustering all of the political support I can to take any stop necessary to make true spacepower and space dominance a reality for the United States of America.

CONCLUSION

America has always been a nation of discoverers and explorers. It suits our national character to pursue the "permanent frontier" of space. Like Columbus, we must dare to move away from the "old world"--old vision, old strategy, old institutions--if we are to truly enter the "new world" of space.

As the senior Senator from New Hampshire, I am proud to represent the state which sent astronaut Alan Shepard and teacher Christa McCauliffe to participate in the national space program. As you recall, Christa perished with her brave comrades aboard the Challenger one awful morning in January 1986. Christa said: "I touch the future--I teach." Christa touched the future in our children, and she sought to touch the future as an astronaut. She created a wave of enthusiasm for space exploration.

We must renew this enthusiasm. The American people are ready. Look at the popularity of space and science fiction films--Apollo 13, Independence Day, Armageddon, and 8 Star Trek movies. Look at the public's fascination with my Armed Services Committee colleague John Glenn's recent journey back to space.

We are nearing the end of mankind's bloodiest century. Through enormous sacrifice, America has preserved her own freedom and freed millions around the world. As leaders, we must seek an Apollo-like commitment from the American people. We must ask them to again reach into space with gusto--for its science, for its mystery, and for the security it can offer us. Control of space is more than a new mission area--it is our moral legacy, our next Manifest Destiny, our chance to create security for centuries to come.

Not two miles from this very spot, more than 200 years ago, Massachusetts colonists fought the British in the Battle of Bunker Hill. A local doctor, Joseph Warren, was asked by his neighbors to stay out of the fight--they were fearful of losing their only doctor. Dr. Warren told them: "On us depends the future of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves." Dr. Warren joined the battle, and was killed. Today, the future of millions yet unborn depends on our willingness to master space. We, too, must act worthy of ourselves.